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By David Lerman Over the last 19 years, the U.S stock market has enjoyed one of the greatest run-ups in history. As measured by the benchmark S&P 500 Index, the annualized compounded return on the market was around 15 percent. Investors small and large have become more market literate as the number of mutual funds exceeds 9,000 and the number of 401(k) accounts in the U.S. exceeds 41 million. In fact, for many, the 401(k) account represents one of their largest assets, if not the largest. Trillions of dollars also reside in taxable mutual funds and with private money managers. But as we all know—especially during the last 12 to 18 months—stock values don't only move upward. Stocks slid nearly 20 percent in just a few months in 1998's third quarter, causing jitters among investors in the U.S. markets. In addition, investors experienced declines during the 2000 calendar year as the S&P 500 showed double digit losses and the Nasdaq-100 was also down substantially. Eight months into 2001 the market continues its downward trend from last year as the major averages continue to show losses. Many wonder how bad it could get and if there is a way to protect their portfolios from significant losses. In fact, there are ways to protect a portfolio of stocks using a variety of futures strategies. This section will focus on one in particular-using stock index futures to hedge equity portfolios. We will also illustrate how investors can use stock index futures to gain market exposure-the so-called "anticipatory hedge." Before we outline the strategies, there are a few items to consider:
Size of Portfolio Construction of the Portfolio Correlation of Equity Portfolios to CME Stock Index Products Tax Considerations Protecting Your Portfolio Figure 1
Along with fund name and amount invested, we have price data for an eight-week period, including the percent decline. We have also included the performance of the underlying cash indexes and their corresponding futures contracts since those would be the instruments used to hedge the funds. The table also includes some data on R-squared values. R-squared ranges from 0 to 100 and reflects the percentage of a fund's movements that are explained by movements in its benchmark index. (Caution: R-squared is not a predictor of relative performance or profitability.) An R-squared of 100 means that all movements of a fund are completely explained by movements in the index. Thus, index funds that invest only in S&P 500 stocks will have an R-squared very close to 100 since they invest in the index itself. A low R-squared means that very few of the fund's movements are explained by movements in its benchmark index. Put another way, funds with lower R-squared values move to the beat of a different drummer and will not mimic the moves of the S&P as well over the long run. In very general terms, high R-squared values mean a portfolio has a good correlation with its benchmark--S&P 500. The first investor had a $400,000 balance in the Vanguard 500 Index fund. I told him he had an adequate balance and that his correlation to the S&P 500 is perfect. It should be as the fund perfectly replicates the index. That fund was down about 9.4 percent. The S&P 500 futures (and the mini S&P 500) were down about 9.88 percent. Basically the fund was a very good candidate for hedging—if he chose to do so. He had a large enough portfolio and a good correlation with the futures—so it would have been a good hedge. It doesn't get any more simple. The second investor had $110,000 in the Janus Fund. The amount invested was not adequate for the regular S&P 500 futures but could be hedged using two mini S&P futures. However, two minis would have a value of $140,000. He would be hedging a $110,000 investment with a $140,000 "insurance policy"-he would be overhedged. Not a bad thing in a bear market but a bit risky should stocks move upward. I also conveyed that the fund was a bit concentrated and had a large tilt toward technology. This explains why it declined twice as much as the index. Hence, if this investor hedged using the E-mini S&P 500 he would have made some profits on the hedge, but not enough to cover the severe decline the portfolio experienced. In summary, I had to confess that the tracking error and concentrated nature of the portfolio could be a problem. The next caller had $52,000 in the T-Rowe Price Blue Chip fund. Again, this fund correlated well with the overall market, had a high R-squared. S&P futures would have been useful as a hedge in this case too. But, unfortunately, this investor had too small a portfolio. Even one mini S&P 500 contract is too large for the amount of assets to be hedged. The person then asked if these new "Spider stocks" might be useful. I smiled and replied yes and sent her to the AMEX (trying to be a good samaritan!). The last caller had almost a million dollars in the Mutual Qualified fund. Since I had some of my own money in this fund I knew it well. Although the investor did have a large enough asset base, there were some items that made this fund a less attractive candidate for hedging with S&P futures. The Mutual Qualified fund is loaded with stocks that many other fund managers would never touch. Michael Price, who ran it for most of its operating history (before he sold his fund company to Franklin Templeton), had an interesting collection of investments. The portfolio had a huge value tilt, including many bankruptcy candidates, companies reorganizing out of bankruptcy, junk debt and a whole collection of investments that much of the Street avoided. Too bad for them, as this and other Mutual Series portfolios had amassed a superb track record (except for during the dot.com mania, where many value investors were left in the dust by technology). Indeed, as 2000 unfolded and much of the technology space become toxic waste, Mutual Qualified did what it usually does in adverse markets--it went up. If this investor had hedged, he would have made money on the hedge as the market slid and would have profited on the investment being hedged since the fund was up 2.9 percent during this time frame. It is nearly impossible to profit on both sides of a hedge! All things considered, the low correlation means that S&P 500 futures would not provide a good reliable hedge in this case. (Note: During the 73-74 bear market, when the S&P was down nearly 50 percent, Price's flagship fund, now run by the great team he left behind, was down less than two percent--an amazing but little known accomplishment in the investing world.) To reiterate, the investor must closely consider the size of the portfolio to be hedged, the construction and the correlation to the futures contract. If an investor had investments primarily in small cap issues, then the Russell 2000 futures might be more appropriate than the S&P 500 in this case. We will now provide details on how such hedges might be constructed. Remember, hedging is insuring against an adverse price move. An adverse price move to a fund holder is a down market. Thus hedges of this sort are also called short hedges, since the investor would have to sell short a futures contract to protect against an adverse price move. If the market did slide, the profits on the short hedge would hopefully offset the losses on the portfolio of stocks. Conclusion Strategy I: Suppose you own a mutual fund or portfolio of stocks that is highly correlated with the S&P 500 composite index (R-squared = 98). The current value of the portfolio is $140,000. Time frame: Early November Current S&P 500 index (cash): 1,400.00 pts. * Each E-mini S&P futures is worth $70,750 (1415 x $50 per pt. = $70,750); thus, two contracts would be required to hedge a $140,000 portfolio. Outcome:
In this hypothetical example, the hedge using E-mini stock index futures fully protected the portfolio against a decline. The decline in your portfolio was offset by gains in the two E-mini S&P futures contracts. You preserved the value of your portfolio despite a significant decline in the market of 15 percent! On the other hand, if the market had advanced, the portfolio's gains would have been offset by losses on the two E-mini S&P 500 futures contracts. If this were to occur the investor would have had to consider removing his hedge by buying back the short futures contracts so he/she could participate in any further upside action. Strategy II: You are expecting a large cash infusion due to the sale of a business. Since you believe that technology stocks are at attractive levels, the cash proceeds (about $100,000) will be invested primarily in high-tech stocks at close of deal in four to five months. Problem: Strategy: Advantages:
If the market rose before you received the $100,000 in proceeds, the futures would also tend to rise, allowing you to participate in the advance. Four to five months later, you could purchase the stocks. The higher price that you would pay would be offset by the profits in the futures contracts. If the prices of stocks (and therefore the Nasdaq-100) declined, your futures contracts would lose money. However, the cost to purchase your portfolio would also be reduced. This "anticipatory long hedge," as it is sometimes called, allows you to enter the market immediately at a fraction of the cost. David Lerman is the senior director of equity index products marketing at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the author of Exchange Traded Funds and E-mini Stock Index Futures. He has traveled around the globe on behalf of the CME, giving seminars and workshops to retail and institutional audiences, including pension funds, corporations, banks and brokers on risk management/trading using equity index futures and options.
CRB TRADER is published bi-monthly by Commodity Research Bureau, 330 South Wells Street, Suite 612, Chicago, IL 60606-7110. Copyright © 1934 - 2002 CRB. All rights reserved. Reproduction in any manner, without consent is prohibited. CRB believes the information contained in articles appearing in CRB TRADER is reliable and every effort is made to assure accuracy. Publisher disclaims responsibility for facts and opinions contained herein. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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